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INTRODUCTION

The face of European products liability may be about to change considerably.
The first places where change probably will occur are in the procedural and funding
areas. Though the density of European products cases has been and probably will
continue to be slight compared to that in the United States, it is of note that a
growing trend within the European case law is a shift to multi-party actions.
Proposed procedural rule changes are about to fuel this shift.' At the same time,
fundamental changes in the way civil litigation is funded within European Union
Member States have disproportionately encouraged group actions.2 They have also
shifted greater risk, responsibility, and power to plaintiffs' lawyers.
On the legislative front, the reform of the separate European products liability
doctrine, set out in the 1985 European Directive on ProductLiability,3 is on hold.
Following both a Green Paper4 and a White Paper,5 the European Commission (the
"Commission") concluded that it had insufficient evidence to advise on the future
of the Directive at present, and thus, it has both set up an expert advisory committee
and funded two major research studies on products liability in Europe. These
studies are to collect information, particularly on the costs that might result from
any future repeal of the most controversial defence in the Directive. Very
significantly, one of the commissioned studies has been set to the task of
investigating the feasibility of introducing a uniform products liability system
across the European Union (EU), replacing the divergent national rules (for

1. For an excellent study of this phenomenon see CHRISTOPHERHODGES, MULTI-PARTY ACTIONS
(2001); see also LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEP'T, CONSULTATION PAPER, REPRESENTATIVE CLAIMS (Feb.
2001), at http://www.lcd.gov.uk/consult/general/repelaims.htm Oast visited May 6,2002); Christopher
Hodges, Multi-PartyActions: A EuropeanApproach, 11 DUKE J. OF COMP. & INT'L L. 321 (2001);
Christopher Hodges, FactorsInfluencing theIncidence ofMultiple Claims,4 J. PERS. INJURYLITIG. 289
(1999).

2. For example, the European Commission has published a proposal for a Directive establishing
minimum common rules relating to legal aid and other financial aspects of civil proceedings in crossborder disputes at COM(2002)13 final. See The Problems Confronting the Cross-Border Litigant:
Green Paper from the Commission on Legal Aid in Civil Matters, COM(2000)51 final; Access of

Consumers to Justice and the Settlement ofConsumer Disputes inthe Single Market: GreenPaper from
the Commission, COM(93)576 final. On the recent introduction in the United Kingdom ofconditional
fees, which are not contingency fees, but "no-win no-fee" arrangements, see LORD CHANCELLOR'S
DEP'T, REGULATORY IMPAT ASSESSMENT:

IMPROVEMENT IN THE AVAILABILITY AND USE OF

CONDITIONAL FEES (Nov. 1998).

3. See Council Directive 85/374, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29 [hereinafter Directive] (addressing
approximation ofthe laws, regulations, and administrative provisions ofthe MemberStates concerning
liability for defective products).
4. Liability for Defective Products: Green Paper from the European Commission, COM(99)396
final; see Jose J. Izquierdo Peris, Liability for Defective Products in the European Union:
Developments Since 1995-The European Commission's Green Paper,1999 CONSUMERL.J. 331.
5. Commission Report on the Application ofDirective 85/374 on Liability forDefective Products,
COM(2000)893 final; see Donna Lambert, EuropeanStrictProductLiabilityLaws,EUROPEANPROD.
LIAB. REV. March 2001, at 16. This was the second report; the first was Commission Report on the
Application of Directive 85/374, COM(95)617 final.
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example, in contract and under sales legislation) that co-exist with the Directive.6
The parallel with the aim of the Reporters of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
ProductsLiability (Restatement Third) should not go unnoticed!
Why should any ofthis be of interest to U.S. lawyers? First, every jurisdiction
has a haphazard experience. By considering the contrasting experience and
response of other legal systems, U.S. lawyers may be alerted to challenges their
own system may have to confront. Secondly, the comparison of how other legal
systems have reacted to a particular socio-economic phenomenon can highlight
neglected gaps and baseless assumptions in the U.S. system. My aim here is to
sketch, for U.S. eyes, the contrasting state of products liability doctrine in Europe
and those foreign jurisdictions that have adopted clones of the European Directive.
But the focus I will use, the lens on our different experiences, will be how regimes
are responding to the increasing challenge ofpathogenically infected products-as
the title of this Essay puts it, "bugs" in products liability. These range from wellknown bacterial infections, such as Salmonella, Legionnella, and Escherichia-coli
0157 (E coli),8 to viral infections, such as the infection of blood by the Human
Immuno-Virus (HIV)9 and Hepatitis C (Hep C),' to diseases, such as Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD). n

6. John Meltzer et al., European Commission Launches Major Product Liability Study,
EUROPEAN PROD. LIAB. REV., Dec. 2001, at 4.
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1998) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
THIRD]. In the Restatement Third § 2 commentn, the Reporters sought, at the level of something they
called "functional requisites," to amalgamate causes of action which rely on identical facts. See also
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensuson Defective ProductDesign, 83
CORNELL L. REv. 867, 918 (1998) [hereinafter Achieving Consensus] ("So long as the functional
requisites of section 2 are satisfied, plaintiffs may couch their design claims in negligence, implied
warranty, or strict liability in tort."). Whether this will succeed inproducing a general simplification of
products liability litigation is amatterofsome controversy. The problem here lies not so much with the
amalgamation of claims that might previously have been argued both under RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (RESTATEMENT SECOND) and negligence theory, for the duplicative nature of
many such claims is fairly well agreed. The difficulty lies in knowing where warranty claims fit in and
whether the full extent ofexisting warranty entitlements is reflected in theRestatement Third. See Jane
Stapleton, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, An Anglo-Australian Perspective, 39
WASHBURN L.J. 363 (2000).
8. See also the following: campylobacterbacteria, cryptosporidium, listeria, botulism, psittacosis,
and mycobacterium avium subspecies paratuberculosis.
9. See, e.g., Simon Garfield, THE END OF INNOCENCE: BRITAIN INTHE TIME OF AIDS (1994).
10. See also the following: the Ebola virus (It is now thought that the Black Death was caused
by this virus being passed from person to person, not via infected rats. Robert Uhlig, Black Death
CausedBy 'Ebola' Virus, Not Rats, DAILY TEL. (London), Nov. 22, 2001 ); Q fever, rhizopus, the foot
and mouth virus, and the smallpox virus.
11. See JENNIFER COOKE, CANNIBALS, Cows & THE CJD CATASTROPHE (1998); DOUGLAS
POWELL & WILLIAM LEISS, MAD COWS AND MOTHER'S MILK (1997); SHELDON RAmPTON & JOHN
STAuBER, MAD COw U.S.A. (1997); RICHARD RHODES, DEEPLY FEASTS: TRACKING THE SECRETS OF
ATERRIFYINGNEw PLAGUE (1997) (detailing the controversy as to the form of the infective agent in
transmissible spongiform encephalopathies); Clive Martyr, BSE in Europe, EUROPEAN PROD. LIAB.
REV., March 2001, at 4; Organic Consumer's Ass'n, Mad Cow Disease available at
http://wwwv.OrganieConsumers.org/madcow.htm (last visited May 6, 2002).
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ROUGH COMPARISON OF COMMON LAW SYSTEMS: FORM AND SUBSTANCE OF

PRODUCT REGIMES
The divergence of the U.S. system from other common law systems is
considerably more striking than that between those other common law systems and
the civil law systems in the EU. This fact is easily set out in a rough comparison of
substantive and legal system characteristics such as that in Appendix A.
In relation to the special products liability rule, the manifestation of this U.S.
divergence that is most obvious to students is length. In the United States, the
seminal doctrinal treatment is the Restatement Third, published in 1998 which runs
382 pages. Contrast this with the Directive, which occupies a little over four pages
in the Official Journalof the European Communities, or compare reported case
law. 2 One of the first cases to deal with the Restatement Third ran to only eight
pages;" one of the first cases to apply the Directive in the United Kingdom ran to
113 pages.14
But there is no mystery here. A non-U.S. jurisdiction, with a uniformly highquality judiciary, single court of final appeal, tight system of precedent, and active
legislature, can often "make do" with a very sparse formulation of its binding
legislative rules. Such foreign jurisdictions accomplish this task because the legal
rules are definitively elaborated in a unitary appellate case law and because
academic treatises serve broadly the same role as the Comments and Reporters'
Notes of the Restatement Third. Similarly, in jury-free systems, the triers of fact
must provide written reasons for their determinations, and this often produces very
lengthy expositions of legal reasoning.
III.

ORIENTATION OF UNITED STATES PRODUCTS REGIMES

Section 402A ofthe Restatement (Second)of Torts (RestatementSecond)'5 was
a top-down law reform motivated, not by social or forensic pressures, but by the
enthusiasm of a small group of Legal Realists that saw the opportunity to make
what they saw as a small win-win change to legal entitlements. Out of, what I call
"classical" (because privity bounded) warranties,"' a new cause of action had
grown; under the tag of strict liability "warranty" claims, plaintiffs were in fact
being allowed to sue manufacturers with whom they had no contractual
privity-what I call "aclassical" warranty claims. If this were so, and if elsewhere,
disguised as "negligence" liability, courts were in fact covertly imposing strict
liability for manufacturing errors in products, then it seemed to make sense to

12. See supra note 3.
13. Delaney v. Deere & Co., 985 F. Supp. 1009, 1017 (D. Kan. 1997) (concerning the grant of
defendant's motion for summaryjudgment). For the appeal, see Delaneyv. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930

(Kan. 2000).
14. In re Hepatitis C Litig. (A v. Nat'l Blood Auth.), 3 All E.R. 289 (Q.B. 2001).
15. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 7, § 402A.
16. JANE STAPLETON, PRODucrLIABILITY 16-20 (1994) (describing classical warranties as those
involving traditional contractual privity between the parties).
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clarify this state of affairs by recognizing a separate class of strict liability in tort
for products defects. The apparent neatness, low impact, and intellectual glamour
of this move led its promoters to overlook major gaps in the theoretical foundations
of the rule in the new § 402A. Traditional incidents of the warranty claim, such as
its limit to products and further, to only those products that had been commercially
supplied were limits that were explicable in classical privity-based warranty
claims. But these limits were then carried over holus-bolus into the Restatement
Second with little orno attempt at justification. Little, if any, concern seems to have
been raised about the fresh anomalies that would be created by separate tort liability
for commercially supplied products. Indeed, it was a revealing feature of the work
of products liability theorists that most resorted to ignoring the destabilizing
phenomenon of bystander injuries before stating a theory of the law, 7 while the
work of general tort theorists, such as Jules Coleman, abandoned any attempt to
accommodate products liability within their scheme of "core" tort law concepts."
Given current product regimes and controversies, it is noteworthy that, in
general, the Restatement Second contained no separate black-letter treatment of
specific product types such as blood, had no separate treatment of types of product
defect, and gave no guidance on what might constitute a product defect." These
oversights maybe explained by the fact that, although the Restatement Second was
not explicitly limited to manufacturing errors, it was clearly intended as a reform
focused on products defects introduced by the manufacturing process. In such
cases, the production line norm offered what seemed to be a simple benchmark for
the requirement of a "defect." This unexpressed focus on manufacturing errors had
a critical effect on the development of U.S. tort law. Together with the lack of a
domestic thalidomide tragedy in the United States, this focus led the drafters ofthe
Restatement Second to overlook the legal dilemma posed by unforeseeable side
effects of a product's intended design.
The 1998 Restatement Third is a considerable contrast to the Restatement
Second. In constructing the Restatement Third, its Reporters were centrally
concerned with perceived bottom-up pressure on the U.S. products regime from
"classic design cases."2 The most common expression of these claims is where the
plaintiff argues that the product did not perform its intended function sufficiently

17. See id. at 127 & n.13.
18. See, e.g., JULEs L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992) (defending and criticizing economic
analysis of tort concepts). In particular, see Chapter 20 for Coleman's analysis of product liability
theory. Id. at 407-29.
19. But see RESTATEMENT SECOND, supranote 7, § 402A cmt k; see also George W. Conk, Is
There a DesignDefect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALEL.J. 1087,
1091-1101 (2000) (discussing the history of § 402A and its application, through comment k, to
"unavoidably unsafe" products such as drugs, cigarettes, and alcoholic beverages).
20. So-called "classic design cases" are ones that "do not involve product malfunctions,
violations ofsafety regulations, oregregiously dangerous products." James A. Henderson, Jr. &Aaron
D. Twerski, What Europe,Japan,andOther CountriesCanLeanzfrom theNewAmerican Restatement
ofProductsLiability,34 TEx. INT'LL.J. 1, 17 (1999) [hereinafterNew American Restatement]. Yet,
"the plaintiffs nevertheless plausibly claim that the designs are unacceptably dangerous, and therefore,
legally defective." Achieving Consensus,supra note 7, at 876-77 (1998)

Published by Scholar Commons, 2002

5

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 20
1230

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53: 1225

well: a chair or axle was "not strong enough," the side-panels of a car were "not
strong enough" in a crash, and so on. While the Restatement Third gives separate
treatment to classes of product claims according to certain proof shortcuts2' and
according to certain product classes such as food,22 the main focus of the Reporters
is on the residual class in §2 under which they accept that most classic design cases
will fall.' Section 2 gives separate treatment to three classes of product defects:
manufacturing defects, design defects, and warning defects.24
Like the RestatementSecond, the Restatement Thirdpays little attention to the
defect issues on which Europeans focus so keenly-those posed by unforeseeable
side effects of intended design. As a result, there is no black-letter treatment in the
Restatement Third of how and why such cases should be treated. However, the
Restatement Thirddoes try to give some guidance on the issue of defectiveness. For
example, under § 2(a), manufacturing errors are not only defined as ones that depart
from their intended design but are, merely by satisfying that definition, classified
as defective conditions.26 In contrast, design and warning conditions that fall within
this residual § 2, such as most classic design cases, are to be judged by
reasonableness criteria.72 By implication then, this means that a product with an
unforeseeable design condition that causes harm cannot, by definition, be defective.
Finally, the Restatement Thirdpays no attention to the phenomenon of the waves
of BSE, CJD, Hep C, and HIV infections that had been appearing since the 1980s
and 90s. This oversight, as we will see, leaves such infection cases to be treated in
a highly fractured manner by the Restatement Third.
IV. ORIENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION DIRECTIVE AND ITS CLONES

The orientation of the Restatement Thirdis in marked contrast to that of the EU
Directive and its clones in other countries such as Japan, Australia, Taiwan, and
Israel.2" The Directive did not result from some perceived bottom-up forensic
pressure from claims. Rather, the engine of this reform was social and political.'
21. See RESTATEMENTTHIRD, supranote 7, § 3 ("Circumstantial Evidence Supporting Inference
of Product Defect;" describing a sort of generously reinterpreted res ipsa loquitur class); see also id.
§ 4 ("Non-compliance and Compliance With Product Safety Statutes or Regulations"); id. § 2 cmt. e
(dealing with "manifestly unreasonable design," other terms for which are categorically defective
design, generically defective design, and egregiously dangerous product type).

22. See id. § 7; see also id. § 5 (components); id. § 6 (prescription drugs and medical devices);
id. § 8 (used products).
23. See generallyStapleton, supranote 7 (discussing the odd positioning of the "residual" section
at the beginning of the Restatement and criticizing other features of the Restatement Third).
24. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 7, § 2.
25. There are two passing mentions in the non-black-letter text. See RESTATEMENTTHIRD, supra
note 7, § 2 cmt. I; § 6 cmt. g (relating to prescription drugs and medical devices).

26. Id. § 2(a).
27. Id. § 2(b), (c).
28. See PRODUCT LIABILITY INTHE ASIA-PACIFIC (Jocelyn Kellam ed., 2d ed. 1999); Luke
Nottage, The PresentandFutureofProductLiabilityDisputeResolution in Japan,27 WM. MITCHELL

L. REv. 215 (2000).
29. STAPLETON, supra note 16, at 37-65.
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In particular, the concern of the public in these countries had been galvanized by
the disaster caused by the unforeseen side effects of the Thalidomide pregnancy
drug.31 Meanwhile, by the late 1970s, the European Commission was keen to
promote consumer protection measures to show Europeans that the "common
market" was not there simply to serve big business. It proposed very pro-consumer
draft Directives in 1976 and 1979.3" Yet there remained intense concern within the
European Parliament and the Council that substantial exculpatory provisions be
included in any future Directive.32
As a result, the Directive is one of the high-water marks of Euro-fudge and
textual vagueness.33 It used a cryptic "definition" of defect in Article 634: "A
product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is entitled
to expect, taking all circumstances into account.... ."" It also allows a Member
State discretion on a number of critical matters including the exculpatory Article
7(e), which became known as the "development risk defence;" Article 7(e) would
allow a manufacturer to escape liability if it can prove that "the state of scientific
and technical knowledge at the time when it put the product into circulation was not
such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered."3 6 Article 15 allows

30. Id. at 39-43.
31. See Commission Proposal fora Council Directive Relating to the Approximation ofthe Laws,
Regulations, and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective
Products, 1976 O.L (C241) 9 [hereinafter First Draft Directive]; Commission Amendment of the
Proposal for a Council Directive Relating to the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations, and
Administrative Provisions ofthe Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products, 1979 O.J.
(C271) 3 [hereinafter Second Draft Directive].
32. See, e.g., Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) Report on Proposal for a Council
Directive on Liability for Defective Products, COM(76)372 final at 41-45 [hereinafter ECOSOC
Report] (stating that industry should not be made "liable forproducts which could not have been made
to a safer standard atthe timewhen they were put into circulation;" "it may be in the patients' interests
to put into circulation products which are known to have side-effects when taken by some or indeed all
persons ....
;"also note early concern about the uncertainty of the concept of undiscoverability in the
comment "scientists might be far less willing than lawyers to define what at the present level of
technological and scientific development is ('undiscoverable') as opposed to undiscovered.
Undiscoverability is itselfvery doubtful from a scientific point of view;" note the view of the Section
for Industry, Commerce, Crafts, and Services against inclusion of liability for development risks
emphasizing that their inclusion "could have an inhibiting effect on innovation." Id. at 44-45.
See also the following reports ofthe Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliamentraising
the concern that liability fordevelopmentrisks mightinhibitinnovation: EUR.PARL.Doc. (COM 246)
26-27 (1978); EuR. PARL. DOC. (COM 71) 16-17 (1979).
33. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
34. It was at the initiation of the Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament that the
definition of defect included this statement that the Court should be required to "take into account all
the circumstances" of the particular case. EuR. PARL. Doc. (COM 71) 18 (1979). Specifically, there
should be a reference to time to make "it clear that the user of an old product cannot expect the same
degree of safety from such a product as from a product which has just been put into circulation." Id.
Characteristically, the pro-plaintiff Commission refused to include this amendment in its second draft
Directive. Second Draft Directive, supra note 31, at 3.
35. Directive, supra note 3, art. 6. Such circumstances include foreseeable use and therefore,
must extend to misuse.
36. Id. art. 7(e).
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a Member State to implement the Directive in domestic legislation without that
defence.37 The final legislative body, the Council of Ministers, even allowed
individual Member State delegations to append Unilateral Declarations to the
Directive to expound their local interpretations of its provisions. The point is that
the Directive tries to square a circle: it uses the rhetoric of "strict liability," and yet,
in Articles 6(2) and 7(e), it seems to provide solid protection for reasonable
businesses, a compromise demanded by the U.K. Government of Margaret
Thatcher.38
Textually, the Directive is in certain respects quite like the RestatementSecond.
It gives no separate treatment to product types or defect types, and the definition of
defectiveness in Article 6 is, at best, circular. On the other hand, just as the focus
of the Restatement Second had been manufacturing errors and the focus of the
Restatement Thirdis on classic design cases, the Directive also reflects its historical
trigger: the Thalidomide disaster. Unlike the Restatements, the Directive attempts
to grapple explicitly with unforeseen side effects of a product's intended design by
giving product suppliers the crucial exculpatory defense in Article 7(e). However,
the Directive has its own gaps; failure to reflect on the U.S. experience leaves the
Directive with no provision as to how to treat classic design cases-the "how strong
should a chair be" cases. Needless to say, just as the Restatements give no guide as
to how infection cases should be handled, nor does the Directive address these
issues.
V. PREMANUFACTURE GENERIC INFECTION CASES

The Reporters of the Restatement Third have attacked the Directive.39 One of
their principal complaints seems to be that it does not distinguish between types of
defect.4" This omission then blocks the Directive from adopting what the Reporters
say is "the [o]nly [s]ensible [s]tandard for [d]efect in [cI]lassic [d]esign [c]ases."'"
This is, they argue, the requirement of convincing proof of a reasonable alternative
design, a requirement the Restatement Third does not impose on plaintiffs in
manufacturing error cases.42 But what if the case in favor of separating out types of

defect is itself dubious? This has always been one of the core dilemmas in modem
products liability and yet again, it is being neatly exposed, this time by
premanufacture generic infection cases.
Premanufacture generic infection cases are a discrete type of case, distinct from
cases of chemical contamination, such as when a worker carelessly puts the wrong
chemical into the water storage pond of a water supply company,43 or a delivery

37. Id. art. 15.

38. Id. arts. 6(2), 7(c).
39. New American Restatement, supranote 20.

40. Id. at 13-14.
41. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
42. Id.
43. A.B. v. S.W. Water Servs. Ltd., 1993 Q.B. 507 (Eng. C.A. 1992).
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person incorrectly mixes fire retardant chemical with stock feed.' Unlike chemical
contamination cases, in premanufacture generic infection case, the danger lies in
the presence of a transmissible pathogen. By definition, premanufacturegeneric
infection cases are distinct from cases where a product is contaminated or infected
during the production process. They are cases where the infection in a product was
present in the raw materials and, therefore, before manufacture of the product.45
Pathogenic infections can be isolated events; take, for example, a local outbreak of
"wool-sorter's disease" caused by one anthrax-infected sheep," Legionnaires'
disease contracted from one infected piece of machinery,47 or the sort of E-coli
0157 infection from one contaminated batch of food that killed twenty-one people
in Lanarkshire in 1996. 4" But the sharpest lessons from infection cases come from
those where it is feared that the infection is generic to a product class as in the case
of BSE, foot and mouth disease, and other recent epidemics.49
To sum up the characteristics I have used to define pre-manufacture generic
infection cases:
(1) The infection is not part of the condition of the product
which the supplier "intended" in the sense of "desired;"
(2) The infection was present before any artificial
"manufacturing" process occurred;
(3) The infection is, however, known or suspected to be
"generic" in the sense that it has affected an entire
product sector such as the beef industry, the blood
product sector, or the water supply;

44. In 1973, toxic chemicals were accidentally fed to dairy cattle in the State of Michigan with
the result that virtually all nine million in the state's human population became permanently
contaminated by the hazardous chemical polybrominated biphenyl. See JOYCE EGGINTON, BIrER
HARVEST 14, 275, 281 (1980). Scientists estimated "that only about 10% of the body burden of PBB
contamination being carriedby nine millionpeople would be excreted in their lifetimes."Id. at 307; see
also Mich. Chem. Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 728 F.2d 373,376 (6th Cir. 1984) (involving
negligent shipment oftoxic-flame retardant as livestock feed additive); Oscoda Chapter ofPBB Action
Comm., Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 268 N.W.2d 240 (Mich. 1978) (involving suit to prevent burial
of contaminated cattle in clay-lined pit).
45. See Jane Stapleton, BSE, CJD, Mass Infections and the 3rd US Restatement, in
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CONSUMERS' ACCESS TO JUSTICE (C. Rickett & T. Telfer eds.)
(Cambridge Univ. Press forthcoming).
46. The scientific name is Bacillus anthracis. See also the meningococcus infection.
47. See, e.g., Brennen v. Mogul Corp., 557 A.2d 870 (Vt 1988) (addressing a case where a
plumber sued manufacturer ofwater treatment equipmentwhen he allegedly contracted Legionnaire's
Disease while working on cooling tower because manufacturer's equipment and chemicals did not
prevent growth of legionella bacteria).
48. Jonathan Leake, New Health Alert as Coli Hits Half of Cattle Herds, SUNDAY TIMES
(London), Sept. 9, 2001, at 5G (reporting that as a result of raw meat coming in contact with cooked
meat, 500 other people became ill).
49. See also Valerie Elliott, DairiesTold To Improve Hygiene ToBeatMilkBug,TIMES (London),
Dec. 7, 2001, at 20 (writing that some scientists fear that a significant but unknown proportion of the
U.K. milk supply is infected withMycobacterium avium subspeciesparatuberculosis,from which each
year 90,000 people in Britain contract Crohn's disease).
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(4) This sector is an "essential" product sector, such as milk
or blood, in the sense that it does not have realistic
substitutes;
(5) The infection in the product type is not present in each
item of the product but testing each item for that
infection is impossible/impractical etc; and
(6) The infection is not necessarily limited to one generation
of products or victims but may be transmissible to
following generations."0
VI. PREMANUFAcTuREGENERICINFECTIONS: SOMEUNITEDKNGDOMSTATISTICS
Before we compare the responses of the different products liability regimes to
these cases, let me sketch some of the socio-economic contexts in which Western
European lawyers will be setting these claims. By far, the most high-profile recent
disaster concerning premanufacture generic infection cases is the U.K. mad cow
(BSE) epidemic. Some statistics may help sketch the magnitude of the problem.
By March 2002, BSE cases in the U.K. cattle population numbered 191,000,1
and 5.5 million cattle had been slaughtered in an attempt to contain the plague."
However, scientists fear that BSE may have become endemic in British cattle
because young cattle are being raised in fields that have been contaminated by the
dung of BSE-infected cattle.53 The infection has spread abroad: it is currently
believed that BSE spread from the United Kingdom across Europe and further
afield by infected proteins used in animal feed. 4 In late 2001, two cows in Japan
were found to have BSE; a limited cull of cattle is now underway in that country."
The magnitude of the public health problem in the United Kingdom is reflected
in the fact that between 1980 and 1996, the number of BSE-infected animals eaten
by the U.K. population is estimated to have been one million. 6 By January 2002,
113 people in the United Kingdom had died from Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD),
the human form of BSEY' Currently, the worst-case estimate of people who are or

50. See, e.g., Robert Uhlig, BSE Cannot Be Inherited by Calves, Study Finds, DAILY TEL.

(London), Feb. 26,2002. Itis currently thought that BSE is transmitted between cattle by giving them
food contaminated with the remains ofinfected animals (butnot from infected mother to offspring). But
see, infra note 66.
51.

DEP'T FOR ENVIRONMENT, FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS (DEFRA), BSE STATIsTICs, at

http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalhfbse/index.html (Last updated Mar. 1,2002).
52. Id.DEFRAathttp://www.defra.gov.ukanimallselbse-statistics/level-3-scheme.html (last
visited May 6, 2002).
53. James Meikle, InfectedFields CouldSpreadBSE,ScientistsSay, GuAIAN (London), Sept.
13, 2001.

54. USA's Mad Cow Risk is Low, Study Finds,USA TODAY, Dec. 3,2001, at 6D.
55. James Brooke, PotentiallyMad Cows to Die, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 27, 2001, at A6.
56. Roger Highfield, Epidemic of Human BSE 'May Be at Its Peak, DAILY TEL. (London)

Oct. 26, 2001.
57. Lorraine Fraser, CharlesBacks ControversialCJD Research,DALYTEL. (London), Jan. 13,

2002.
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will be infected by CiD stemming from the current outbreak of BSE in cattle is
136,000, of whom 40,000 will die of the disease despite its long incubation period
because they were sufficiently young when infected 58 Faced with civil claims from
families affected by CJD,s9 the U.K. Department of Health set up a £55 million
compensation trust fund. 6' This amount is likely to be grossly inadequate if BSE
has infected the national sheep herd. If such is the case, the U.K. government has
announced that the entire flock of40 million sheep will be culled. 6' Even with such
a cull, the worst-case estimate of future vCJD deaths if sheep have been infected

with BSE, is around 150,000.62 Also, it is already known that ClD has been
contracted through infected products from human bodies, such as dura mater,
transplant tissue, human growth hormone, and fertility products. 63 It is feared that
human CJD infection may occur through the possible generic infection of a number
of product sectors (that is, where it is suspected that there is a risk of infection but
no way of screening and isolating all particular cases of infection) such as vaccines67
66
65
4
(and other blood products such as plasma),' meat, gelatin, dairy products,

58. MarkHenderson,NumberofvC1Dcases 'WillNotExceed40,000,' TIMES (London), Oct. 26,
2001.
59. The civil cases, known as the Creutzfeldt-JakobDiseaseLitig.,maybe found atthe following:
54B.M.L.R. 1 (Q.B. 1995) (No. 1); 54B.M.L.R. 8 (Q.B. 1996) (Nos. 2, 4); 54B.M.L.R. 79 (Q.B. 1996)
(No. 3); 54 B.M.L.R. 85 (Q.B. CA 1997) (Nos. 2,4); 54B.M.L.R. 92 (Q.B. 1997) (No. 5); 54B.M.L.R.
95 (Q.B. 1998) (No. 6); 54 B.M.L.R. 100 (Q.B. 1998) (No. 7); 54 B.M.L.R. 104 (Q.B. 1998) (No. 8);
54 B.M.L.R. 111 (Q.B. 1998) (No. 9).
60. £155,000forvCJD Victim An Insult, TIMES (London), Nov. 17, 2001, at Scotland 6.
61. Plan to CullAll Sheep ifBSE is Found,DAILY TEL. (London), Sept. 28, 2001.
62. Mark Henderson, Sheep Meat May PoseMassive CJDRisk, TIMEs (London), Jan. 10,2002,
at 8; Roger Highfield, Scientists Refuse to Rule Out Epidemic of vCIDfrom Sheep, DAILY TEL.
(London), Jan. 10, 2002.
63. See COOKE, supranote 11; RAMPTON & STAUBER, supranote 11, at 71; RHODES, supranote
11, at 131-51.
64. The U.K. government concedes that blood products including vaccines may be at risk of
contamination by CYD. Lois Rogers & Bryan Christie, Scientists Warn ofCZDRisk in Child Vaccines,
SUNDAY TIMES (London), Feb. 22, 1998, at 7. Thenceforward, the Department of Health advised (a)
that the CJD risk with currentblood supplies was "theoretical," but (b) that experts agree that there is
no way ofguaranteeing this. See HOUSEOFLORDSDEBATES, 590 Hansard 680 (June 5,1998) available

at http://vvwv.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ldldhansard.htm (last visited May 6, 2002); HOUSE OF
LORDS DEBATES, 611 Hansard 985 (Mar. 30,2000); HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES, 345 Hansard 124
NH (Mar. 7, 2000), availableat http://wv.publications.parliament.uk/palcm/cmhansard.htm (last
visited May 6, 2002).
65. Continuing uncertainty on this issue is reflected in the fact that the U.K. government is
funding the research of minority-view scientists who suspect beef is not the cause of CJD. Valerie
Elliott, Scientists to Test if
Beef is the Cause of CJD, TIMES (London), May 18, 1999, at 15; METRO
(London) Oct. 12, 200 1. Some postulate a key role for divalent cations such as Manganese, which is
found in many manufacturing processes and in pesticides. George Monbiot, Mad Cows, Bretons and
Manganese: The FrenchCases ofBSE MayNot HaveBeen SpreadfromBritian,GUARDIAN (London),
Nov. 23,2000.
66. RHODES, supra note 11, at 257.
67. David Brown, FoodAgency Urges MassScreenings ofSheepforBSE,DAILYTEL. (London),
Nov. 1,2000.
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human blood,68 human tissue,69 leather or woolen clothing,7" and the water supply.71
In July 1996, Carleton Gajdusek, who won the 1976 Nobel Prize in Medicine for
his work on transmissible spongiform encephalopathies in humans, noted that in the
United Kingdom:
[A]ny species could be carrying it-dairy cows, beef cattle, pigs,
chickens.... All the pigs in England fed on this meat-and-bone
meal.... Probably all the pigs in England are infected. And that
means not only pork. It means your pigskin wallet. It means
catgut surgical suture, because that's made of pig tissue. All the
chickens fed on meat-and-bone meal; they're probably infected.
You put that stuff in a chicken and it goes right through. A
vegetarian could get it from chicken-shit that they put on the
vegetables. It could be in the tallow, in butter.... These people
who've come down with CJI) have given blood. It's undoubtedly
in the blood supply.... And by the way, it could be in the milk.
72

The BSE/CJD crisis and its poor handling by Member State governments and
central EU authorities has had a dramatic impact on the issue of food safety in the
EU, which is now recognized as a core issue in European Community policy.7" In
68. Early suspicions among a minority of scientists that CJD could be spread by blood donations
is reported by Nicholas Schoon, C.ID CouldBe SpreadbyBlood Transfusions,INDEP. (London), Oct. 8,
1997, at 1.Plans were made to banplasma made from pooled donations of U.K. blood donors because
of CJD risk. Nigel Hawkes, BritishBlood ProductsBanned as Too Risky, SUNDAY TIMES (London),
Feb. 27, 1998, at 1. This ban was put in place in May 1998. Joanna Blythman, Blood on the Boil,
GUARDIAN (London), May 14, 1998. It was reported that "Britain's blood supplies are almost certainly
infected with the human form of mad cow disease, the Government has been told." U.K. MAIL
(London), July 6, 1998, at 20. The NHS has been reported as considering banning all transfusion
recipients from donating blood, which would eliminate ten percent of donations. James Meikle, CIrD
Fears CouldLead to Blood DonorBan, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 21, 2000. It is feared that half the
U.K. blood donors will refuse to donate from fear that the CJD screening process will reveal they are
infected. James Meikle, Blood Supplies 'Could Be Halved' as DonorsFearResults of vCID Tests,
GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 2, 2001.
69. For an early report of suspicions of the possibility of CJD infection from donated implanted
tissue, see Jeremy Laurance, Transplant PatientsRisk CJD After Receiving Tissue from Infected
Woman, INDEP. (London), Dec. 1, 1997, at 3.
70. In a 1998 study, researchers found a startling and confusing link between CD and "exposure
to leather, including wearing it." Celia Hall, ResearchFailstoFindLinkBetweenBeefandCJD, DAILY
TEL. (London), Apr. 10, 1998, at 13.
71. On suspicions that part of the U.K. water supply is contaminated with BSE/CJD, see Charles
Arthur, Animals Raise New Fearon Spread of CJD, INDEP. (London), Aug. 30, 1997, at 8; Anthony
Mitchell et al., Don 'tDrinkthe Water, DAILY EXPRESS (London), May 25,2001. Similar fears exist in
Ireland where a high proportion of water is contaminated with animal slurry. Lorna Siggins, Report
Attempts to Put Public'sFears in Context, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, at 7.
72. RHODES, supra note 11, at 220-21.
73. Martyr, supranote 11. See also the withering report by the European Parliament on the BSE
fiasco at the EU level, Resolution on the Results of the Temporary Committee of Inquiry into BSE,
1997 O.J. (C 85) 61. At the U.K. level see the Phillips inquiry at Report to an Order of the Honourable
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response to this crisis, the EU amended the Directive in 1999 to remove the
possibility that a Member State could bar claims concerning unprocessed primary
products. 74
The scientific uncertainty concerning the nature and transmission routes of
these infectious diseases makes it of considerable concern that some captive and
free-range deer and elk in Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
and Wyoming suffer from Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD), a member of the
transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) group of diseases which also
includes BSE and CJD.75 Indeed, an estimated fifteen percent of wild deer in the
United States are already infected, making CWD a "front-burner" public-health
concern. 6 Culls of thousands of U.S. deer and elk are under way.77 It is significant
that three hunters in America have already died of CJD.7 Finally, transmissible
mink encephalopathy has broken out in at least eleven U.S. milk farms.79
The general state of infection in human food in the United Kingdom has
become a matter of grave national importance. There are between 4.5 and 5.5
million cases of food poisoning per year."0 Poisonous bacteria has been found in
half of all chickens sold,8 ' while it has been reported that E-coli has been
discovered in half of Britain's cattle herds. The concern over British food was
compounded by the 2001 outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. The number of
animals affected was around 3,500,3 and ten million animals (seventeen percent of
all U.K. livestock) were slaughtered in the subsequent preventative cull. 4
Finally, the national supply of blood products in the United Kingdom is
suspected of being generically infected. The first high-profile wave of infection was

the House of Commons for the Report Evidence and Supporting Papers of the Inquiry into the
Emergence and Identification ofBovine Spungiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and variant CreutzfeldtJakob Disease (vCJD) and the Action Taken in Response (Oct. 2000), available at
http:llAwv.bse.org.uklreportlindex.htm (last visited May 6, 2002).
74. Council Directive 1999/34/EC, 1999 O.. (L 141) 20-21. On the exemption, see STAPLETON,
supra note 16, at 303-05.
75. MadCow-LikeDiseaseSpreadsRapidly in WildDeer,ENVTL.NEwSNETWORK, Oct. 1,2001;
David Usborne, Elk Get Blame as US is Hit by CJDScare,INDEP. (London), Jan. 21, 2001.
76. Joseph B. Verrengia, Disease Prompts Slaughter of Elk, Deer Herds, SEATTLE TIMES,
Mar. 17, 2002, at A7.
77. Id.
78. Charles Clover, Vets to Test Wild Animalsfor 'MadDeerDisease,'DAILY TEL. (London),
May 3,2001.
79. David Usborne, 'Mad Cows'May Have ReachedMidwest, INDEP. (London), Jan. 15,2001.
80. Danger of Eating Out, DAILY EXPRESS (London), Jan.10, 2002; Rise in Food Poisoning
Cases, DAILY TEL. (London), Feb. 12, 2002.
81. Richard Alleyne, Poisonous Bacteria Found in Half of All Chickens Sold, DAILY TEL.
(London), Aug. 17,2001.
82. Leake, supra note 48, at 5G.
83. Charles Clover & Sandra Barwick, Foot andMouthEpidemic is World's Worst, DALYTEL.,
(London), Sept. 4, 2001.
84. Robert Uhlig, 10 Million Animals Were Slaughteredin Foot andMouth Cull, DAILY TEL.
(London), Jan. 23, 2002. It is of interest that while the cost of the foot-and-mouth outbreak was £2
billion, £1.2 billion of this is being claimed from E.U. See Melissa Kite, TIMES (London), Nov. 23,
2001, at 1.
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by the HIV virus. This was followed by a wave of Hep C infection. The impact of
these disasters on the U.K. hemophiliac population of 5,000 is illustrative: their use
of infected blood products during the 1980s resulted in 1,200 contracting HIV of
whom 800 have died,8" and 4,800 contracting Hep C of whom more than 110 have
died.86 In the United Kingdom, virtually all hemophiliacs who are presently over
the age of fifteen are infected with HIV, Hep C, or both. 7 To date, Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Germany, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the
United States have banned blood donations by people who had lived in the United

Kingdom during the BSE/CJD outbreak.88 Of course, the United Kingdom cannot
impose a similar ban on its domestic donors.
VII.

RESPONSE OF THE RESTATEMENT THIRD

By omitting any substantive discussion in its text, the Restatement Third
suggests that, apart from blood infection cases, the United States has had no
significant case law experience with generic infection cases formulated as products
liability claims. In addition, in the blood infection cases, the consensus seemed to
be that it was too difficult to accommodate them coherently within the U.S.
products liability rule.89 In other words, the U.S. rule could not both extend to such
cases and accommodate an adequately convincing explication of the policy and
moral issues at stake. These cases had, after all, led to the widespread adoption of
"blood shield" statutes in most states. 90 But, if we were to speculate upon what

85. DAILY TEL. (London), Nov. 11, 2001.
86. Helen Studd, HepatitisCases LandNHS With £10m Bill, TIMES (London), Mar. 27,2001, at
5L. In the United States, half the haemophiliac population contracted HIV or Hep C from blood
products. Conk, supranote 19, at 1090.
87. See supra note 64. Compare the U.K. experience with the Hep C disaster in Canada.
According to Michael Trebilcock et. al.,DoInstitutionsMatter?A ComparativePathologyofthe HIVInfectedBlood Tragedy, 82 VA.L.REv. 1407, 1485-86 (1996), it was conservatively estimated in 1996
that there are 100,000 people in Canada infected with Hep C, the current per unit risk of blood for Hep
C is one in 40,000, as many as 12,000 people may have been infected with Hep C between 1986 and
mid-1990 when screening began in Canada, and that seventy percent of Canadian hemophiliacs over
the age of seven are infected with Hep C. In Canada, class actions related to infection with Hep C from
blood precipitated a settlement of $1.5 billion (Canadian). Garry D. Watson, Class Actions: The
CanadianExperience, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 269, 282-83 (2001).
88. See Patrick Barkham, AustraliaBansBlood ofTravellersto UK, GUARDIAN (Aus.), Sept. 22,
2000; Blood Ban, SuNDAY TIMEs (Canada), July 18, 1999, at 26; Jill Carroll, Tighter Blood-Donor
Rules Are Backed To FightSpreadofMad-Cow Disease, WALL ST. J., June 5,2001, at B4. The bans
apply to those who spent more than six months in the United Kingdom between 1980 and 1996. Id.
89. Even under a negligence theory, plaintiffs have typically failed. See Christopher DeMayo,
Malpractice:Alaska Supreme CourtLimitsDuty ofHospitalsto Disclose Risks ofBlood Transfusions,
26 J.L. MED. &ETHics 252,252 (1998) (discussing a holding that there existed no duty to warn ofrisk
ofHep C from transfusion); GeorgeW. Conk, The True Test: Alternative SaferDesignsforDrugsand
49 UCLA L. REv. 737, 773-74 (2002) [hereinafter
MedicalDevicesin a Patent-ConstrainedMarket,
The True Test].
90. See DAN B. DOnns, THE LAW OF TORTS 979-980 (2000). But see Conk, supra note 19, at
1091 -1101 (staging a bracing attack on the protective attitude of blood shield statutes). For cases that
succeeded despite these laws, see R. Jo Reser & Barbara A. Radnofsky, New Wave of TaintedBlood
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approach to pathogenic infection cases would be taken under the Restatement
Third,we would find it highly fractured according to the type of product:
(1) If the infection was contracted from human blood or human
tissue, the Restatement Thirdprovides no redress;"
(2) Ifthe infection was contracted from a vaccine, the case would
be decided under § 6, which provides special protection to
defendants;92
(3) If the infection was contracted from food, the case would be
decided under § 7, which would only provide recovery on the
basis of the consumer expectations test, namely if a
reasonable consumer would not expect the food to contain
that infection. Even within this class, as we will see, the case
law divides incoherently between sub-classes;93
(4) If the infection was contracted from other products, such as
leather or woolen clothing, the case would be decided under
§ 2. Even here, the treatment is explicitly fractured according
to how we classify the product condition:
(a) If the product condition is classified as a "manufacturing
defect" case, just as infected raw material cases are
currently classed (on the basis that the condition of such
infected products departs from their intended easilyknown design), recovery would be possible without
further proof of defect, a "reasonable alternative design"
(RAD) or fault.
(b) If the product condition is classified as a design/warning
case (on the basis that the artificial manufacturing
process did not introduce the problem), defectiveness
would be determined by the cost-benefit/reasonableness
principle and the RAD requirement.
Of course, this odd fragmentation prompts the question ofwhy the Restatement
Third differentiates between product types at all.94 Perhaps, when a new legal rule
emerges without a well-conceived theoretical basis, as was the case with the
Litigation: HepatitisCLiabilityIssues, 67 DEF. COUNs. J. 306 (2000). Interestingly, the blood shield
statutes followed an epidemic of transfusion-associated Hepatitis in the mid-1960s. See Conk, supra
note 19, at 1098-99 (arguing thatstatutes' enactmentled to the continuing transfusion infections in the
decades that followed). "The blood shield laws thus allowed the blood industry to continue to make
blood products that were avoidablyunsafe ... "Id. at 1100.
91. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 7, § 19(c).

92. Id. § 6. See also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, DrugDesigns Different,
111YALE L.J. 151 (2001) [hereinafter DrugDesigns] (rebutting Conk's criticism of the Restatement
Third).
93. See infranote 95 and accompanying text.
94. See Conk, supra note 19, at 1088-90 (attacking the "special, protective standard" given to
prescription drugs and medical devices in § 6).
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Restatement Second, courts are tempted to give the rule "structure" by
compartmentalizing fact situations. In theory, if not in practice, it is very easy to
distinguish cases of infection from eating meat and cases of infection from wearing
infected clothing. The problem is that the law has no compelling reason to make the
distinction-quite the contrary.
Consider the position of five different people who have contracted CJD from
five different classes of BSE-infected products. Whatever the product vehicle for
the infection, there is a very strong argument that the moral, deterrence, and other
socio-legal concerns, which are common across all five cases, swamp any special
factor relating to a particular product type. This is also true within a product class.
For example, the incoherence of the treatment of infected food cases in the United
States already highlights this flaw in the structure of the U.S. regime; food which
happened to be classed as "adulterated" by infection is treated under a
manufacturing errors framework, but food which happened to be classed as
"inherently infected" is treated more like a design case.95
Infection cases also illuminate the central absence of a rationale for the
Restatement Third regime-namely, its attempt to treat manufacturing errors
separately. Why are manufacturing errors treated differently from other product
conditions in Restatement Third? The origin of the special regime for products
liability is traditionally recognized as having drawn its features from both warranty
and tort. However, warranty does not provide a foundation for the special treatment
of manufacturing errors in our modem separate product regimes.
It is true that, for more than a century before the Restatement Second, courts
allowed plaintiff-buyers to succeed in warranty claims against a product supplier
even though the relevant product condition, such as infection in milk, was
undiscoverable." This warranty liability was, therefore, clearly strict. Moreover,
these "classical" warranty claims were just as available in relation to a product
design and were just as strict. The reason that this strict-liability-for-design norm
did not prove unworkable was that a warranty claim only succeeded if the product
failed in one of its intended uses. In other words, classical warranty cases were
effectively ring-fenced by the requirement that the plaintiff prove the product had
"failed in its intended use." This was a requirement a plaintiff could rarely meet in
a design case because, in virtually every case, the manufacturer would have at least
tested his design to ensure it did what it was supposed to do. This meant that there
was no need or rationale for warranty law to distinguish manufacturing from design
cases. Both could be kept within bounds. Strict liability could be imposed on both.
Rather, it was from the negligence side that the special treatment of
manufacturing errors originated. To many observers, negligence courts seemed to
have ratcheted up the standard of care in manufacturing error claims, though the

95. See Stapleton, supra note 45.
96. See Frost v. Aylesbury Dairy Co., 1 K.B. 608, 610 (C.A. 1905).
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requirement of fault was never explicitly abandoned." In time, this treatment led
to the widespread conclusion that the law, in effect, imposed covert strict liability
for manufacturing errors, albeit under the guise of the tort of negligence. In the
United States, recognition of a separate products rule in tort in the 1965
Restatement Second, aimed to regularize this perceived masking of a pocket of
strict liability. So, what we now have in the Restatement Thirdis a regime where
a product with a manufacturing error, even if the error is unforeseeable, by
definition is defective. This is real strict liability for manufacturing errors. In
contrast, a product with a dangerous design condition, if the danger is
unforeseeable, cannot, by definition, be defective. Liability for design is not strict,
but is based on and bounded by reasonableness.
As Appendix B shows, premanufacture generic infection cases share factual
characteristics with both the traditional classification of manufacturing defects
cases and the traditional classification of desigu cases. This means that, before we
can successfully classify premanufacture generic infection cases as one orthe other,
we need to be clear about what factual characteristics we have used to distinguish
types of product condition and to be clear about the normative basis for drawing
distinctions based on those characteristics. The Reporters define "manufacturing
defect" as the product departing from its intended design.9" Infected products
certainly depart from what the manufacturer hoped the product condition would be,
but the manufacturing process did not introducethe danger. It follows that if the
reason we subject manufacturing errors to strict liability is embedded in the idea
that the danger was introduced into the product by the artificial process of
manufacture, premanufacture generically infected products would fall outside the
classification of "manufacturing errors" and therefore outside strict liability
treatment. The absence of an agreed-upon rationale for the imposition of strict
liability on manufacturing error conditions is reflected in the incoherence of U.S.
case law on isolated infected products. Remarkably, this theoretical void exists even
though these were the product conditions that were at the very heart of the new tort
rule set out in the RestatementSecond.99

We still have no principled explanation of why, for example, it is fair to hold
a manufacturer strictly liable for some product flaws he could not discover (for
example, some manufacturing errors), but not fair to do so in relation to a different
set of product flaws he could not discover (namely, unforeseeable design
dangers).' We have never clarified whether the normative motive for a harsher

97. I have yet to find a case based on a claim in the tort of negligence where the imposition of
strict liability could be the only explanation for the result. For example, I have been unable to find a
case where liability was imposed even though all parties agreed that the relevant risk was completely
unforeseeable. Of course, if such a case did exist, it could only be explained on the basis of strict
liability, because it is not possible to be careless in relation to a risk that is unforeseeable.
98. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supranote 7, § 2(a).
99. See Stapleton, supra note 45.
100. Ofcourse, even in negligence, we tolerate significant pockets of liability that is strict-the
objective standard of care, recovery for "unforeseeable" consequences of breach, and unforeseeable
eggshell skulls. There can be reasons for strict liability-for example, technology-forcing, loss
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attitude to manufacturing errors stems from a specific, albeit unexpressed, rationale
concerning the distribution of risks associated with dangerous conditions introduced
into products by artificial manufacturing processes. Additionally, we have never
clarified whether the pragmatic argument in favour of strict liability for
manufacturing errors, namely the availability of the production line norm, requires
the departure from that norm be due to the failure of the production system. Case
law experience on both sides of the Atlantic, even in cases of isolated infected
products, gives little conceptual or pragmatic guidance on these crucial questions.
This gap means it is not possible to determine from first principles how and why
we should classify premanufacture generic infection cases.
In short, infection cases highlight both the absence of any fundamental
rationale for the traditional tri-fold classification of product defects and suggest that
it is unlikely for there to be any agreement on where and why such lines should be
drawn before a full debate on the issue has occurred. A recent high-profile
academic debate has unwittingly confirmed these points. In 2000, George Conk
launched a scathing attack on how the Restatement Third had, under § 6, given
especially protective treatment to prescription drugs and medical devices.'' As an
exemplar of the problems he argued would be created by § 6, Conk referred to the
alleged "design defect" in blood infected with Hep C.1 2 In their response article,
the Reporters attempted to rebut this classification by merely asserting that "[t]he
plaintiffs in the blood cases did not claim that the blood products that harmed them
were defectively designed .... Instead, the contaminants that caused their harm

constituted manufacturing defects...." 03 Conk's otherwise powerful reply seems
just as ad hoc on the classification point:
The basic distinction between a manufacturing defect and a
design defect is that the former departs from the manufacturer's
specifications and intentions for the product. A claim of design
defect attacks the manufacturer-designer's product concept or its
failure to adopt specific safety measures....
This "departure from its intended design" definition of a
manufacturing defect underlies my categorization of the defect in
[the blood product] as one of design .... [V]iral contamination

was not a flaw, a departure from design expectations, or even
from consumer expectations, but rather was considered an
"acceptable risk," one left by the manufacturers to their
customers' physicians to manage medically. Decisions on
whether... to flameproof fabrics are considered product design

spreading, superior information ofthe defendant, proofproblems-but what we do nothave is a reason
substantial enough to delineate and defend the boundaries of this special pocket of strict liability for
products from the general law of negligence.
101. Conk, supra note 19,passim.
102. Id. at 1112.
103. DrugDesigns, supra note 92, at 160.
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choices .... The defect in [the blood product] was neither an
unintended departure from manufacturer's specifications, nor a
disappointed consumer expectation defect like botulism in
improperly canned food, but rather one of design....
Every batch of the concentrated blood proteins was made
without departure from its intended design. The hemophiliacs'
product liability claims, therefore, were not for manufacturing
defects. Rather, the hemophiliacs... correctly alleged design
defects, citing failure to market apractical and feasible alternative
safer design.'
VIII.

RESPONSE OF THE DIRECTIVE AND ITS CLONES: THE PROBLEM OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND THE "OFFICIAL" RECORD

Does the Directive provide a clearer resolution of the anomalous treatment of
manufacturing errors thatpremanufacture generic infection cases expose? Certainly
the Directive has no confusing fracturing around the classification of the product
type. There is also no explicit classification based on type of product defect.
Moreover, in the general law of the EU and its Member States, there are no laws
shielding certain entities, such as blood banks, no equivalent doctrine of federal
preemption under which so many U.S. infection claims can be held to be barred,
and no general tort immunity for state entities. 5 On the other hand, unlike in the
U.S. regimes,' 6 under the Directive, a party cannot sue for physical loss to its
commercial property.' 7 This means, for example, that the claims against cattle feed
producers currently being made by French farmers whose stock has allegedly
contracted BSE from the feed cannot be brought under the Directive.'
Finally, it is significant that under the Directive a product condition may
qualify as a defect under Article 6, but not attract liability because it was
undiscoverable at the time of circulation and so triggers the development-risk
defence in Article 7(e). In contrast, under § 2(b) of the Restatement Third the
undiscoverability of a design flaw prevents the product from even qualifying as
defective.
As Appendix C shows, products case law under the Directive and its clones is
very thin. Importantly, European case law concerning infected products is just as
104. The True Test, supra note 89, at 772-73 (citations omitted).
105. See, e.g., Boulahanis v. Prevo's Family Mkt., Inc., 583 N.W.2d 509, 509 (Mich. Ct. App.

1998) (holding the claims of consumers who were made sick (one died) by beef infected with E Coli
0157 were preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act); cf. Smith v. Secretary of State for Health
(Q.B. Feb. 15,2002) (Morland, J.), availableat http://wvw.lexis.com (concerning a negligence claim
against the government agency which regulates medicines by child whose Reye's Syndrome was
triggered by aspirin).
106. David A. Fischer & William Powers, Jr., PRODucTsLIABILiTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 567

(2d ed. 1994); RESTATEMENT THIRD, supranote 7, § 21 cmt. e.
107. Directive, supra note 3, art. 9.
108. See Martyr,supranote 11, at 14. The U.K. exported potentially contaminated feed to sixtynine countries. FrenchMinistriesare Raided in BSEInquiry, INDEP. (London), Jan. 18, 2001.
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incoherent as infected product case law in the United States, though for different
reasons. The principal case, at least of those available in English, is In Re Hepatitis
9 Here 114 British claimants
CLitigation(A v. NationalBloodAuthority)."'
sued the
National Blood Authority (NBA) over Hep C infection from blood products."'
When the trial judge, Justice Michael Burton, looked at the idea of defect in Article
6 of the Directive, he rightly noted that the words in "all relevant circumstances"
must be read in the light of the statutory purpose."' But, as we have seen, there was
no coherent and consistent statutory purpose behind the Directive. It was a political
fudge that tried to square a circle. It used the rhetoric of strict liability and yet
seemed to protect reasonable businesses in Article 6(2) and 7(e)." 2
An added problem for the trial judge was that a large proportion of the
historical record available to the court consisted of papers from the European
Commission, which unlike conventional Westminster-style bureaucracies, is not
obliged to provide neutral advice to the EU institutions. In particular, it could well
be argued that the role of the European Commission prior to the Final Directive of
1985 was highly partisan.
It is well known that the Thalidomide tragedy focused, and perhaps unduly
mesmerized, European attention on cases of generic product conditions. But it is
inaccurate to conclude that all European countries wanted strict liability imposed
on manufacturers, even if it was limited to cases of personal injuries. No Member
State ratified the 1977 Convention of the Council of Europe, "3 which containedjust
such a regime. Another reason Member States failed to ratify the (non-EC)
Convention was that, as we have seen,"' within the European Communities
political concern arose in the late 1970s to give the European Communities a
"human face," to show, for example, that ithad consumers' interests at heart as well
as being concerned with the facilitation of a level playing field for business. "'
However, Member States were firmly divided on the substantive content of any

109. 3 All E.R. 289 (Q.B. 2001). The author of this Essay acted as Consultant to the defendants

in this case.
110. Id. Though this was a group action, it was also a "test" case for the 3,000-5,000 people in
the United Kingdom who have contracted Hep C from transfused blood and blood products. In the
United States, there are about2.7 millionpersons chronically infected with HCV. MiriamJ. Alteretal.,
ThePrevalenceofHepatitisC VirusInfection in the UnitedStates, 1988 Through 1994,341 NEWENG.

J.MED. 556,556 (1999). Before 1990,300,000 people received blood products and are therefore at risk
of having been infected with Hepatitis C. Reser & Radnofsky, supra note 90, at 317. In the United
Kingdom, most health care is delivered under the National Health System (NHS). The supply of goods
and services under the NHS is free at the point of delivery, and there is no contractual relationship
between the patient and any party within the delivery system.
111. InreHepatitsCLitig, 3 All E.R. at 290.
112. Directive, supra note 3, arts. 6(2), 7(e).
113. Council ofEurope, European Conventionon ProductsLiabilityin Regard to PersonalInjury
and Death, (Strasbourg, Jan. 27, 1977) available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/

en/Treaties/HtmlI091.htm (last visited May 6, 2002).
114. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
115. STAPLETON, supra note 16, at47-48; FrankA. Orban, II, ProductLiability:A Comparative
Legal Restatement-ForeignNationalLawandthe EECDirective,8 GA. J.INT'L & COMP. L. 342,374

(1978).
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new Directive on products liability.
The result of the protracted and often grossly secretive negotiations,116 a result
not achieved until 1985, was a Directive with a cryptic text that even the European
Court of Justice, the highest court in the EU, has attacked as hard to interpret." 7 A
major danger when approaching the interpretation ofthe text is the past attitude of
the Commission. Throughout the 1970s, the Commission embraced a strong
preference for an unqualified strict liability being imposed on manufacturers for
injuries due to the condition of their product. This is reflected in the fact that neither

of the Commission's draft Directives (1976 and 1979)"' mention any exculpatory
ideas couched in terms of "state of the art" or "development risks." Yet, there was
intense concern within the European Parliament and the Council that substantial
exculpatory provisions should be included." 9 For example, the official Economic
and Social Committee (ECOSOC), that represents sectional interests (mostly
workers) 2 ' and advises the Commission and the Council, maintained that industry
should not be made "liable for products which could not have been made to a safer
standard at the time when they were put into circulation" and specifically noted that
"it may be in the patients interests to put into circulation products which are known
to have side-effects when taken by some or indeed all persons.""2 ' The same
concern prompted other EU institutions to make two critical exculpatory changes
to the Commission's proposed text. One was the inclusion in the Article 6'"
definition of defect, not merely of the time qualification that a relevant factor was
"the time when the product was put into circulation," but the statement that "a
product shall not be considered defective for the sole reason that a better product
is subsequently put into circulation;" the second was the inclusion of the
development-risk defence in Article 7(e) with an option for an individual Member
State to exclude that defence."2 The Commission's continued opposition to such
pro-defendant amendments was deeply resented by some Members of the European

116. Onthe secrecy ofthe Council's deliberations, see Commission's WrittenAnswerto Question
No. 1152/84.
117. Case C-300/95, Comm'n v. United Kingdom, 1997 E.C.R. 1-2649, [1997] All E.R. 481
(providing a report which includes both the judgment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the
advice given to the Courtin the previous Opinion ofthe Advocate General (Jan. 23,1997) (G. Tesauro)
that reached the same conclusion via a somewhat different route).
118. See First Draft Directive, supra note 31, at 9; Second Draft Directive, supranote 31, at 3.
119. See supra note 32.

120. PAUL CRAIG & GRAMNE DE BORCA, EC LAw 89-90 (1995).
121. ECOSOC Report, supra note 32, at 41-45.
122. See supranote 34 and accompanying text.
123. Directive, supra note 3, at 29-33. See Kathleen M. Nilles, Note, Defining the Limits of
Liability: A Legal andPoliticalAnalysisofthe EuropeanCommunity ProductsLiabilityDirective,25
VA. J. INT'L L. 729, 754 (1985) (describing how it was the Council's Permanent Representatives
Committee (COREPER) inFebruary 1982 and not the Commission that formulated the route to the final
'options' compromise, abandoning the absolute position on development risks adhered to by the
Commission); see also Amended Proposal from Presidency of Council (Apr. 26, 1985), which sought
to accommodate theposition ofsix delegations opposed to liability for developmentrisks. These were
not the only points on which the Commission was defeated. For example, there was an insertion of
option concerning an exemption for unprocessed agricultural products.
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Parliament. For example, in debate one Member accused the Commission of
misleading the European Parliament in order to get the Commission's pro-plaintiff
product liability proposals accepted while another complained that the2 European
4
Parliament's proposals were "arbitrarily changed by the Commission."'
The Commission's attitude seemed to be the result of three factors. First, at the
outset, the Commission asserted, at least in public, that Member States genuinely
were willing and committed to providing a legal entitlement to compensation to
those in the future who found themselves in the equivalent position of the
Thalidomide children. This necessitated the imposition of genuine strict liability,
at least for unforeseeable generic design conditions. Secondly, the Commission
shared a common crude misconception, circulating in Europe in the 1970s, that the
common law in the United States had successfully adopted genuine strict liability
for products merely by making producers liable on proof that the plaintiff had been
injured by a "defect" in the product.121 Of course, the actual position was very
different and less impressive. The reformists behind § 402A of the Restatement
Second 26 were centrally concerned only with manufacturing errors. Here the notion
of"defect" seemed unproblematic because it could be, it was thought, conveniently
determined by the production line norm. Later events revealed that § 402A failed
to address the sort of claims that were to trouble the legal regimes in the United
States (classic design cases) and Europe (allegedly unforeseeable generic
conditions). Thirdly, the Commission seemed to think that the notion of defect
could be deployed independently of an evaluation of the "appropriate" or
"reasonable" level of safety to be required of a product. This crudely sanguine
attitude cannot withstand the most elementary consideration of classic design cases
such as a claim that a chair or axle was "not strong enough."' 27
By the time of the adoption of the Final 1985 Directive, it was clear that the
U.K. Government would only agree to a Directive that gave industry the capacity
to answer a claim on the basis that it had done all it realistically could and should
have done to make the product safe in all the circumstances.' Other demands by

124. See EUR. PARL. DEB., 1980-1981 O.J. (Annex 1-256) 261, 293 (1980), quoted in the
excellent study of the Directive's history byNilles, supranote 123, at 753, n.143,754, n.146; see also

Nilles, supranote 123, at 757-58 (blaming the slow progress on the agreement of a Final Directive on,
interalia,the intransigence and the lack ofrigourby the Commission that polarized interested parties);
The Lord Griffiths et al., Developments in English ProductLiability Law: A Comparison with the

American System, 62 TU. L. REv. 353, 389 (1988) (concerning the strong opposition of theEuropean
Parliament to the inclusion of liability for development risks in the Commission's drafts).
125. See, e.g., Hans Claudius Taschner, ProductLiability in Europe: FutureProspects,in EEC
STRICT LIABILITY IN 1992 81, 89 (P.L.I. ed., 1989): ("[T]he concept of defect has not caused any

practical difficulties for courts throughout the world.").
126. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 7, § 402A.
127. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.

128. The British Minister for Consumer Affairs noted the United Kingdom's insistence on "the
incorporation ofthe 'state of the art' defence." See 991 PAD.DEB.,H.C. (5th Ser.) col. 1107 (1980);see
also id. at cols. 1106-1200; DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM OF
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LEGISLATION (1985). "[The 1979 Commission draft Directive] was not

acceptable. One of the most important changes to be sought was the incorporation ofa 'state of the art'
defence. This is now incorporated in the proposed [Final] Directive." Id. T 11. "The standard [of
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Member States ensured the final text of the Directive was a political "fudge" that
tried to square the circle of disagreement between Member States by use of
ambiguous terms and a cryptic text. Most importantly, other Member States
acquiesced in the attachment-to the Council's decision on the Directive-of a
number of Unilateral Statements by individual delegations, including a Unilateral
Statement by the UnitedKingdom Delegationon Article 7(e) which stated:
This provision should be interpreted in the sense that the producer
shall not be liable if he proves that, given the state of scientific
knowledge at the time the product was into circulation, no
producer of a product of that kind could have been expected to
have perceived that it was defective in design.129
The whole purpose of the insertion, against the wishes of the Commission, of the
exculpatory defence in Article 7(e), as well as the time dimension introduced into
the notion of defect in Article 6, was to give a substantial protection to industry,
particularly new and innovative industries. Yet, even after the adoption of the 1985
Directive with these provisions, Hans Claudius Taschner, 3' a principle member of
the Commission's products liability team, maintained that the correct interpretation
of the Directive was one that gave little, if any room, for defendants to exculpate
themselves from liability.'
The political reality is that the Thatcher Government used its EU legislative
veto to insist on protection for a producer who had done all it realistically could and
should have done to make the product safe in all circumstances. More generally, the

defectiveness] should be determined objectively having regard to all the circumstances in which the
productwas put into circulation... [and] aproductshall notbe considered defective for the solereason
that abetter product is subsequently put into circulation." Id. 13. "Both the House of Commons and
industry consider [the developmentrisks] defence as asine quanon for their agreement to the Directive.
It is now included in the proposed [Final] Directive." Id.
129. Note Point"A "au Conseil(8205/85): Statements To Be Enteredin the CouncilMinutes 7
(July 23, 1985).
130. Sometime Head ofDivision, Directorate General for Internal Market and Industrial Affairs,
European Commission; Adviser to the Hep C claimants.
131. Concerning the risk in the Thalidomide case, Taschner claims it was not "absolutely
unforeseeable" and so was not a true example ofa development risk for which liability was removed
by Article 7(e). Hans Claudius Taschner, European Initiatives: The European Communities, in
COMPARATIVE PRODUCr LiABILiTY 1, 6 (C.J. Miller ed., 1986) (claiming that the opposite was
"wrongly considered by the two British Law Commissions"). Since, he asserts, the criterion for
development risk is that the "existing defect could not be discovered by anyone," Taschner's view is
that Article 7(e) would not protect the producer in a new Thalidomide-like disaster. Id. at 11; see also
Hans Claudius Taschner, Harmonizationof ProductsLiability Law in the European Community, 34
TEX. INT'L L.J. 21, 32 (1999) [hereinafter Harmonizationof ProductsLiability Law]. In contrast to
Taschner, most commentators consider thatArticle 7(e) wouldprotect the defendant in such cases. See
Aubrey L. Diamond, ProductLiabilityandPharmaceuticalsin the UnitedKingdom, in CONSUMERLAW
INTHE EEC 129, 135 (G.F. Woodroffe ed., 1984) (citing the view of the Pearson Commission at
1259); ChristopherNewdick, StrictLiabilityforDefectiveDrugsin thePharmaceuticallndustry,101
L.Q. REv. 405,408 (1985); M. Griffiths, Defectiveness in EECProductLiability1987 J.B.L. 222,227;
PARL.DEB. (H.L.) col.1455 (1980) (Lord McKay of Clashfern).
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literature on the status of Unilateral Statements from Member State delegations is
thin. This is odd given that their existence exposes the political controversies to
which they bear witness. It is also odd given the potential political storm that may
flow by any crude enforcement of a rule that Unilateral Statements should not be
132
considered in determining the appropriate interpretation of the EU instrument.
Certainly, an argument can be made that unless the European Court of Justice is
willing to imply that the other Member States acted in bad faith in acquiescing to
the U.K.'s Unilateral Statement, the Directive should be read, at least by U.K.
courts, in the light of the U.K.'s Unilateral Statement and the clear demands of the
United Kingdom for a substantial defence for industry. This was, after all, a
Directive that explicitly gave considerable latitude to Member States to achieve
local variations in the regime it sets up. Indeed, this political reality seems to be
what lay behind the fairly cryptic European Court of Justice judgment in favour of
the United Kingdom in European Commission v. United Kingdom,'33 which
Taschner has attacked as "misunderstanding" the Directive.134 The European Court
of Justice held that the development-risk defence in Article 7(e) would succeed if
the knowledge of the defect existed but was not "accessible."' 35 The liability regime
demanded by the United Kingdom would also require similar "reasonableness"
'
glosses on other issues such as whose ideas were relevant to "knowledge."136
In short, official EU papers describing the Commission's pre-1985, proplaintiff vision for the content of a products directive and later comments by
Taschner do not in any way capture the true compromise finally adopted in the text
of the Directive. They fail to address the profound implications for the defect notion
of the insertion of the time clause in Article 6 and the dilemma of how to determine
defectiveness in design or warning, such as the classic design cases of the chair and
axle, without the consideration of notions of behaviour and reasonableness.
Commission documents also afford Article 7(e) a width so narrow and nugatory
that they could suggest the United Kingdom was deceived by the other Member
States in the meaning of the alleged agreement to the Final Directive. Yet it seems
that Commission documents available to the court in the Hepatitis C case far
outnumbered any official papers opposed to Commission proposals. These are

132. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-283194, C-291/94 & C-292/94, Denkavit Int'l BV, VITIC
AmsterdamBV, VoormeerBVv. BundesamtfurFinanzen, 1996 E.C.R. 1-5063 atJ28 (acknowledging
that a substantial group of Member States had believed that "when the Directive was being adopted by
the Council, it was agreed that relatively vague terms should be used in order to allow for differing
interpretations according to the requirements of the domestic legal systems"); see also Jan Klabbers,
Informal InstrumentsBefore the European Courtof Justice,31 CoMMON MKT. L. REv. 997, 1008-09
(1994) (discussing reliance on Member States Declarations in legislation minutes); SirWilliam Nicoll,
'Note the Hour-andFile the Minute,' 31 J. COMMON MKT. STUDs. 559, 561 (1993) (stating that
"[d]eclarations have no legal value, but they offer some insight into the intentions of the parties").
133. Case C-300/95, Comm'n v. United Kingdom, 1997 E.C.R. 1-2649, [1997] All E.R. 481.
134. Harmonization of ProductsLiabilityLaw, supra note 131, at 34.
135. Case C-300195, Comm'n v. United Kingdom, 1997 E.C.R. 1-2649,[1997] All E.R. 481. See
Taschner, supra note 131, at 34.
136. Jane Stapleton, ProductsLiabilityin the UnitedKingdom: The Myths of Reform, 34 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 45, 59 (1999).
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critical points for addressing the dilemma of what is to be taken as the statutory
purpose of any EU Directive.
IX. RESPONSE OF THE DIRECTVE AND ITS CLONES: THE HEPATITIS C JUDGMENT
In the Hepatitis C case, the court noted that the Directive "must be construed
by reference to its recitals and indeed to its legislative purpose, insofar as it can be
gleaned otherwise than from the recitals."'3' The court asserted in a number of
places that "the purpose of the Directive is to achieve a higher and consistent level
of consumer protection throughout the Community and render recovery of
compensation easier, and uncomplicated by the need for proof of negligence."' 38
Yet the court gives little if any weight to Recital 7, which states a purpose of the
Directive was to vindicate the notion that a "fair apportionment of risk between the
injured person and the producer implies that the producer should be able to free
himself from liability if he furnishes proofas to the existence of certain exonerating
circumstances."' 39
Similarly, the court neglects two important political facts: the United
Kingdom's Unilateral Statement and the fact that the European Parliament and
Member States successfully insisted, against the opposition of the Commission, on
the inclusion of exculpatory provisions to achieve that "fair apportionment."
Moreover, the court marginalizes the important legal fact that, when in European
Commission v. United Kingdom, 4 ' the European Court of Justice read into the
Directive extra concerns, they were ones that provided exculpation for defendants.
Finally, the court ignored the phenomenon well-known among comparative lawyers
that-in contrast to the "candour" of pragmatic regimes such as that in England,
Scotland, and the Netherlands--courts in certain continental legal systems use
"hidden and indirect means of controlling" liability arising from the formal
statement of broad entitlements.' This phenomenon is obviously relevant to
properly "domesticating" an EU provision couched in vague terms.
In short, the court in the Hepatitis C case was determined to give the Directive
"work to do" in the United Kingdom; 42 that is to give it a wider ambit of
entitlement than existed elsewhere in the English law of obligations. It was eager
to avoid a construction that would "not only be toothless but pointless."' 4 3 The trial
judge seems to have thought this required an adoption of the construction urged by

137. In re Hepatitis C Litig., 3 All E.R. 289, 305 (Q.B. 2001).
138. Id. at 310-11; see also id. at 328 (stating that the purpose of the Directive was "consumer
protection and ease ofrecovery of compensation."); id. at 342 (stating purpose was "to prevent injury
and facilitate compensation for injury."); id. at 341 (explaining analysis of Article 7(e) to achieve
underlying purpose).
139. Id. at 304 (quoting Recital 7).
140. 1997 E.C.R. 1-2649, [1997] All E.R. 481.
141. M. BussANI & V. PALMER, THE FRONTIERS OF TORT LIABILITY: PURE ECONOMIC Loss IN
EUROPE, 71, 152-53 (2002).

142. In re Hepatitis C Litig., 3 All E.R. at 289.
143. Id. at 340.
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the claimants. In my view, this was mistaken. For example, it would still be
consistent with the pro-consumer purpose of the Directive, as selected by the judge,
that the Directive was aimed merely at leveling up other Member States to the level
of consumer protection already in place in the United Kingdom. In any case, the
Directive did unequivocally make a number of improvements to the position of the
U.K. consumer that did not require the court to adopt the claimants' construction.'"
In my view, the "reformist zeal"' 45 of the trial judge in the Hepatitis C case
simply preferred the heroic rhetoric of the claimants' cause.' His decision has
already faced academic criticism,'47 and there are certainly some very strange
factual holdings and pieces of legal reasoning in it-most of which are not directly
pertinent to the topic of this Essay. However, one core aspect of his approach is
relevant here. To find in the claimants' favour, the trial judge created a new set of
central concepts and then implied them into the Directive. Specifically, while he
concludes that "there is no place.., in the Directive" for the "American terms" of
manufacturing defects, design defects, and instruction defects,'4 8 the trial judge
himself read into the Directive distinctions based on type of product defect. Indeed,
he constructed a whole new class of product conditions called "non-standard
products" which covers not only manufacturing error cases but also covers
premanufacture infection cases.' 49 By then asserting that a nonstandard product was
to be compared with the "standard" (that is intended, and hoped for) state of the
product (namely one that was not infected), the judge arrived at the conclusion that
the infected batches of blood had been defective.' The classification as
"nonstandard" seems inexorably to lead to a finding of defect, at least if there has
been no warning.
Though the defect provision, Article 6, stresses that "all the circumstances" are
to be taken into account, the judge reformulates this as all the circumstances
relevant to the purpose of the Directive. By this device and his focus only on the
pro-consumer goals of the Directive as set out in its recitals, he excludes, as
irrelevant to defectiveness, issues such as the avoidability of the dangerous
condition,' the utility of the product line, whether safer substitutes were feasible
144. Stapleton, supra note 136, at 61-62.
145. Geraint Howells & Mark Mildred, Infected Blood: Defect and Discoverability.A First
Exposition of the ECProductLiabilityDirective, 65 MOD. L. REv. 95, 98 (2002).
146. In re Hepatitis C Litig., 3 All E.R. at 289.
147. See Christoper Hodges, Compensating Patients, 117 L.Q. REv. 528 (2001) [hereinafter
CompensatingPatients];Howells &Mildred,supra note 145, at96-98; Simon Pearl, DamagingGoods,

SOLICITOR'S J., May 11, 2001, at 424.
148. In re Hepatitis C Litig., 3 All E.R. at 318.
149. Id. at 319. And product conditions classified "as a design defect resulting from a way in
which the producer's system was designed." Id.
150. Id.

151. In my view, avoidability is not necessarilyrelevant, but can be when it is combined with the
absence of available substitutes and high utility. For instance, what if a vaccine is developed that can
immediately and permanently clear the HIV virus from the system of an infected fetus? The vaccine
involves a risk of slight ofhearing loss to one to three percent of affected fetuses but there is no test to

prescreen which fetus will have its hearing damaged. The fetus cannot be warned, the utility of the
vaccine is high (because there are no substitutes), and the cost risked is low. Yet according to the trial
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and the cost of seeking to limit the risk, even if these factors are judged with
hindsight. It goes without saying the judge also ignored the sort of public-policy
concerns about the special importance of a blood supply that led to the blood shield
laws in the United States. 52

However, consider how this approach to the Directive would apply to
"standard" products such as aspirin, an issue that is of immediate concern to the
public. Even consumer advocates regard aspirin as nondefective despite the risk it
poses to some users and the consumers' unawareness of the risk.'53 On the one
hand, the Hepatitis C court chose consistency and stated that utility should be
ignored here just as it asserts it should be ignored when judging the defectiveness
of nonstandard products." But if we ignore the overall social utility of the standard
product, which in the case of aspirin is universally acknowledged to be massive,
how can aspirin's nondefectiveness be established given that, from the perspective
of the victim, its cost outweighed its benefit? The court's attempt to bridge this gap
in its approach is the mere assertion that "standard products, if compared at all, will
be compared with other products on the market."' 5 But this is, of course, itself a
utility measure: a product's defectiveness being measured by any available
substitutes on the market that have more successfully avoided the risk!'56
What the Hepatitis C court seems to have done is extend the former class of
"manufacturing errors" to include premanufacture infection cases, naming this new
class "nonstandard" products. This extension does not avoid the unprincipled and
anomalous treatment of a class of product conditions simply on the basis that they
can be cheaply compared with a product condition that the producer hoped to
produce, the so-called "standard" product. If aspirin can be judged nondefective
even though it cannot be made safe for all users, why should nonstandard products
that cannot be made safe for all users, but which have equivalent massive social
benefits and low risk, be nondefective? This point is not academic but one of real
practical importance.
Say a product is developed that immediately clears HIV infection from an
infected fetus's system but causes mild hearing loss in a percentage of those treated,
and the state of scientific knowledge is such that this can neither be avoided nor the
cases where this injury will occur be identified in advance. When the defectiveness
of the product is being determined under the Directive, why should it matter if the
product is a pure chemical preparation (like aspirin, a "standard" product) to which
judge, these factors are not relevant to defect. Id. at 290.
152. CompensatingPatients,supra note 147, at 530. The trial judge went on to hold, in relation
to the defence in Article 7(e), that once risk of infection in a product sector was "known," the
development-risk defence was no longer available even if the dangerous condition was not discoverable
in an individual product. In re Hepatitis C Litig., 3 All E.R. at 305. This means that after the first
victim's claim, nonstandard products cannot attract the defence. Id.
153. Howells & Mildred, supra note 145, at 101.
154. In re Hepatitis C Litig., 3 All E.R. at 339.
155. Id. at319.
156. Directive, supranote 3, art. 6. Article 6 of the Directive, with its emphasis on time frame,
strongly suggests that the existence or nonexistence of feasible substitutes was intended as relevant to
the notion of "defect." Id.
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an undetectable percent of users is prone, or a vaccine derived from blood which
has an undetectable infection in some percent of doses (like Factor VIII, a "nonstandard" product)?157 If, as the Community has said, one of its major aims is to
promote competition and innovation, and if, as it has also said, "effective legal
protection is a vital incentive for innovation,""' there seems to be some room for
the argument that innovation leading to the development of one form of a HIV
product should not be disproportionately inhibited. Yet this is exactly what is
threatened by the approach taken by the Hepatitis C court.
My general point here is not that the decision in the Hepatitis C decision was
necessarily wrong. 59 It is to show that, like the Restatement Third, the Directive
does not accommodate premanufacture infection cases at all clearly because the
entire regime lacks a coherent rationale. But whereas the failings of the Restatement
Third stem from the over compartmentalization of doctrine and the neglect of
discoverability issues, in Europe it was the incoherent political purpose of the
Directive and its fudged terminology that has presented EU courts with the job of
choosing the central norms on which it is to be read. Whichever side of the
normative line one might choose, it is impossible to be confident that the text of the
Directive delivers a clear vindication of that position.
X. OTHER RESPONSES TO PREMANUFACTURE GENERIC INFECTION CASES

Three cases show that a court dealing with the Directive or its clones might
6
simply opt to use norms opposite to those chosen by the Hepatitis C court.' " In

157. The approach of the court in the Hepatitis C case seems to dictate that the vaccine is
defective. In re Hepatitis C Litig., 3 All E.R. at 339. But how odd, then, that such a lifesaving product
with no substitutes is defective but a nonlifesaving standard product with many safer substitutes, such
as a car, may be judged nondefective!
158. Green Paper on Innovation from the European Comm'n, COM(95)688 final at 19. See
ChristoperHodges,DevelopmentRisks: UnansweredQuestions, 61 MOD.L.REV. 560,561-62(1998).
This was also the concern of ECOSOC when it advised the Directive that it should not inhibit
innovation. See supra note 32. But see Mark Mildred & Geraint Howells, Comment on Development
Risks: UnansweredQuestions, 61 MOD. L. REv. 570 (1998) (critiquing Hodges's article).
159. In my view, the text of the Directive clearly failed to achieve the imposition of strict liability
on product manufacturers. Unless those who hoped that it would do so accept that it failed to do so and
act to ensure that the Directive is reformed carefully and precisely to achieve this imposition, continued
confusion is likely as courts are forced "to make it up as they go along." The Hepatitis C case also
raises an interesting issue concerning the feasibility of a contribution action by the National Blood
Authority (NBA) against any pharmaceutical company who had supplied theNBA withinfectedblood
products. In some otherjurisdictions such companies are required to contribute substantial sums to the
state compensation schemes for Hepatitis C victims of infected blood products. Ina Brock, State
CompensationforHCVInfections in the FederalRepublic of Germany, EUROPEAN PROD. LIAB. REV.,
Dec. 2000, at 16.
160. Certainly it is not unusual for common law courts dealing with strict liabilities to embrace
this opposite norm. For example, when addressing the strict liability provision against misleading and
deceptive conduct in § 52 of the Trade Practices Act, 1974 (Austl.), a court recently stated that "it
cannot reasonably be expected that the supplier isto inform the public of every possible risk... in the
ordinary course of human affairs things go wrong in connection with the supply of products and
services and.., nobody could reasonably assume, absent disclosure, thatsuch supplywill berisk free."
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Scholten v. The FoundationSanquin ofBlood Supply,16 ' a Dutch court held that
while the HIV infected blood was defective, it was protected by the development
risk defence in the Directive. Similarly, a Canadian judgment, albeit not a case on
the Directive, reflected the same normative impulse as that at work in Scholten. In
Ter Neuzen v. Korn,'62 the Canadian Supreme Court refused to imply a warranty of
merchantability in a case involving HIV infection from an artificial insemination
procedure, noting in dictum that, "it must be recognized that biological products
such as blood and semen, unlike manufacturedproducts, carry certain inherent
risks." '
The court held that at most the standard should be one of
reasonableness.'"
Thirdly, we have Ryan v. Great Lakes Council, an Australian case of food
poisoning from hepatitis-infected oysters. 6" The plaintiffs failed in their claim
under a clone of the Directive. Though the judge found the product was defective,
he held that the development risk defence protected if the defect in the individual
productwas not capable of discovery and this was the case with the oysters. 66 In
terms of our conflicting norms, the judge agreed with the impulse in Scholten and
TerNeuzen-thatthe risk of scientific unavoidability should not rest on the oystergrowers. 67 He refused to distinguish between the unfairness in holding
manufacturers liable for designflaws they could not discover as in Thalidomide and
the unfairness in holding them liable for premanufacturing infections that they
could not discover.
More fundamentally, the Ryan case, like most infection cases, highlights the
artificiality of any product/service distinction in our law of obligations and the
incoherence of the idea that products liability can sensibly look at the product and
not the human behaviour surrounding its production and handling. In Ryan, the
hepatitis infection of the oysters could have been prevented by reasonable
surveillance of the quality of the water supply; thus, although the claim under the
clone of the Directive failed, parallel claims in negligence succeeded.'68 This
vitality of negligence,' 69 a vitality rooted in its focus on human behaviour and the

Johnson Tiles Pty v. Esso Austl. Ltd. (2000) 104 F.C.R. 564, 592, 67.
161. Scholten/TheFoundationSanquinofBloodSupply, Rb., Amsterdam, 3 februari 1999, NJ 621
(ann. DJV).
162. Ter Neuzen v. Korn, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 674.
163. Id. at 108.
164. Id.
165. Ryan v. Great Lakes Council (1999) 78 F.C.R. 309, on appealsub nom., Graham Barclay
Oysters Pty v. Ryan (2000) 102 F.C.R. 307.
166. GrahamBarclay Oysters Ply, 102 F.C.R. at 462.
167. Id.
168. In this regard, it is interesting to note two recent Italian decisions (not dealing with the
Directive) in which the Italian Ministry ofHealth was found to have been careless in relation to the risks
of infections in blood, including the risk of Hep C infection during the same years at issue in In re
Hepatitis C Litig. See Roberto Marengo, Court of Rome Rules on Liabilityfor HIV HBV andHCV
Infections, EUROPEAN PROD. LiAB. REV., Sept. 2001, at 28 (discussing Court of Appeal of Rome
decision Oct. 2000) and Court of Rome decision (June 2001)).
169. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality ofNegligence and the Ethics ofStrictLiability, 15 GA.
L.REv. 963 (1981).
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platform it provides in each case for the examination of the complex moral and
economic dilemmas that can characterize product cases, prompts one to ask why
we have a separate regime for product injuries at all.
But infection cases also prompt us to ask why such a regime is limited to
products that have been commercially supplied. It is certainly tough to justify why
we have a separate liability rule that only covers cases of infection by contact with
infected products that have been commercially supplied, but not cases of say the
American hunters infected by deer suffering from CWD, or neighbours infected by
170 or
the wind from pyres burning stock slaughtered in a foot and mouth epidemic,
1 71
animals?
diseased
by
infected
farmers, abattoir workers, and slaughtermen
Certainly we now see from the Restatement Thirdthat the experiment has been
abandoned in the United States in the case of product conditions classed as design
or warning conditions. In these cases, the U.S. courts now recognize that you
cannot coherently detach the concept of defect from behaviour. Perhaps it will be
the infection cases that finally convince jurisdictions on both sides of the Atlantic
and beyond that the treatment of imposing true strict liability only for
manufacturing defects is not only anomalous and normatively unacceptable, but
unworkable. If we are to treat infection cases as harshly as manufacturing error
cases, which is what the English court chose to do in the Hepatitis C case, we will
have to explain why transfusion recipients get a strict liability remedy while it is
the blood from infected donors or were
refused to those who, for example, collected
172
otherwise environmentally infected.
XI. CONCLUSION

When we look through the dramatic lens of premanufacture generic infection
product cases, we see that neither the Restatement Third nor the Directive
coherently cope with the challenges they throw out. These cases force us to
confront the question of whether it was wise, either as a matter of theory or
pragmatism, for the Restatement Thirdto carve out for "special" treatment classes
of product claims according to proof shortcuts and according to product classes
such as food. They also prompt us to ask whether it was wise to give separate
treatment to manufacturing errors on the one hand from that given to design and
warning conditions on the other. Even more fundamentally, the infection cases also
170. See DAiLYEXPRESS(London), May25, 2001 (discussing atmospheric and water supply risk
of CID infection from burning of cattle in the foot and mouth cull); see also Nigel Hawkes, Animal
Pyres Linked to Cancer Risk in Milk, TIMES (London), May 26, 2001, at 10 (discussing chemical
contamination by this route: More than six million of the animals slaughtered in the 2001 foot and
mouth outbreak in the United Kingdom were burned on massive funeral pyres. Yet this process itself
increased the atmospheric dioxin level by an average of eighteen percent over the nation, and there is
now major concern about the contamination of milk from nearby herds!).
171. See David Brown, Worst of the Epidemic Over by Election Day, DAiLY TEL. (London),
Apr. 26, 2001, at 15; Sally Leany, We're Not Safe Yet, DAiLY TEL. (London), Apr. 23, 2001.
172. Each year in the United States 5,600 health-care workers acquire Hep C through accidental
needle sticks. See K. Elieson, Legal Standards Applicable to Transmission of HIV and Other
Communicable Diseases, 61 TEx. B.J. 938, 944 (1998).
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force us to question why in the Restatement Thirdand the Directive we tolerate a
special tort rule for injuries that happened to have been caused by commercially
supplied products.
From the perspective of many decades of experience, there does not seem to
be any particular moral, economic, or social reason why the victims of such injuries
should have been accorded any more special treatment than the victims of medical
misadventures or environmental disasters-both areas in which plaintiffs typically
find it hard to establish liability under traditional causes of action. The concern I
share with other commentators is that the creation of special rules for injuries
associated with commercially supplied products warps our laws of obligation for
little if any benefit and blinkers us to important common themes that run through
all personal injury cases generally.
Though neither the Restatement Third nor the Directive provides a clear
accommodation for premanufacture generic infected product cases, we have seen
that the reasons for their failure differ. Both regimes have developed through the
particular, accidental, and necessarily limited local experience. 73 Both have gaps.
Both sides have lessons to learn from the experience ofthe other. The world's legal
systems are not in competition. We simply do not confront the same advantages and
disadvantages. But there are also limits on the fruitful lessons we can learn from
other systems. Comparative law can be illuminating, but it has many limitations,
not the least of which are the language barriers and prejudices most of us labour
under when seeking to learn from the experience of other systems. It is a valuable
corrective to the more ambitious claims of comparative law scholarship to
remember that, even among most comparativists, deep expertise is limited to a few
systems.

173. Eric A. Feldman,BloodJustice: Courts,Conflict,andCompensationinJapan,France,and
the United States, 34 LAW & SOCIETy REv. 651 (2000).
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APPENDIX A
COMMON LAW SYSTEMS: WHAT Do THEY HAVE IN COMMON?

Compare
Non-Common
Law Systems
Substantive Legal
Differences

UK

Canada
(Not
Quebec)

Australia

New
Zealand

USA

EU
itself

Written Constitution?

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

EU
Member
States,
Oxcept
Eire &
UK
Yes

Federal system that
explicitly divides
legislative competence
on basis of subject

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes/No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

N/A

Yes/No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

High

Medium

High

High

Medium

Relatively
High

???

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes/No?

matter?

Sub-national
legislative capacity in
Private Law?

Unitary (i.e. national)
Private Common (i.e.
judge-made) Law?
Does fact-finder give
written reasons?

Level ofjudicial
loyalty to precedent
consistency of
outcome?

Publicly-funded law
reform bodies?

I

Legal System Differences
Adversarial?
Are juries common in

Yes
No

Yes
Varies

Yes
No

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Yes
No

Yes/No?
No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

Not
High

High

Not
High

Not
High

Very
High

High
W.R.T.
A-G

High?

private law?

Are punitive damages
rare in private law?

Are contingency fee
arrangements often
used?

Loser pays winner's
costs?

Are (many) judges
elected?

Level of influence of
the Legal Academy on
the development of the

cormon law?.
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Compare
Non-Common
Law Systems

Substantive Legal
Differences

UK

Canada

Australia

New
Zealand

USA

EU
itself

Broad consensus for
comprehensive social
secority/welfare
support?
Is the quantum of
damages subject to
tight judicial control?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

N/A

EU
Member
States,
except
Eire &
UK
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

NIA

Yes
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B

How PREMANUFACTUIE GENERIC INFECTION (P-M GI) CONDITIONS STRADDLE
PRO- AND CON ARGUMENTS CONCERNING STRICT LIABILITY
3R = RESTATEMENT THIRD.
Manufacturing
error:
argumentsfor
strict liability

P-MGI cases:
favouring strict
Liability
Heo C 2001

Risk of
unavoidable
failureof
manufacturing
system should
be on the
manufacturer
Fairto
defendant to
impose liability
for
unforeseeable
product
conditions
The pragmatic
convenienceof
theproductionline norm
supports
imposition of
strict liability

PremanufactureGeneric
infection cases:
characteristics

P-MGI cases:
not favouring
strict liability

Design conditions:
arguments against
strictliability

Dangernot introducedby
manufacturingsystem...
militates againstimposition
ofstrict liability

Scholten 1999

Risk of
unavoidable
inadequacy of
scientific
knowledge should
not be
on the
manufacturer

Korn 1995

Ryan 1999

Treatment
under 3R, ofraw
materials

Treatment
under 3R, offood
seen as
"adulterated"by
infection

Risk isforeseeablein the
generic class; but
unforeseeable in the
individualproduct...

The existence ofthe
intendedhopedfor
production-linenorm lends
pragmaticsupport to
imposition ofstrict liability

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol53/iss4/20

Blood shield
statutes

Treatment
under 3R, offood
seen as
"inherently"
infected

Unfair to defendant
to impose liability
for unforeseeable
product conditions

The absence of a
convenient norm
militatesagainst
imposition of strict
liability
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APPENDIX C
174
CASES INVOLVING THE DIRECTIVE AND ITS CLONES

EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE

1. Case C-203/99, HenningVeedfaldv. Arhus Amtskommune, 2001 E.C.R. 1-3569
(the first products liability Reference for a Preliminary Ruling to be referred to the
European Court of Justice concerning Council Directive 85/374/, 1985 O.J. (L 210)
29). See also L.Mattheussens & B.Oosting, The Danish Kidney Case, EUROPEAN
PROD. LIAB. REV., June 2001, at 20.
2. Case C-300/95, European Comm'n v. United Kingdom, 1997 E.C.R. 1-2649,
[1997] All E.R. 481.
3. Case C-293/91, European Comm'n v. France, 1993 E.C.R. I-1.
UNITED KINGDOM

1. Bogle v. McDonald's Rests. Ltd., [2002] E.W.H.C. 490 (Q.B.) (Field, J.)
(concerning personal injuries from hot drinks)
2. Smithkline Beecham Pic. v. Home-Roberts, 2001 E.W.C.A. 2006 (Civ. 2001)
(dismissing appeal from Home-Roberts v. Merck & Co., 2001 C.P. Rep. 80 (Q.B.
2001) (Bell, J.)).
3. In re Hepatitis C Litig., A v. Nat'l Blood Auth., 3 All E.R. 289 (Q.B. 2001)
(Burton, J.) (alleging defective blood resulting in hepatitis C infections; on Oct. 28,
1999, trial judge had refused application for a Reference to the European Court of
Justice for a Preliminary Ruling concerning Council Directive 85/374/EEC, 1985
O.J. (L 210) 29); See also Simon Pearl, DamagingGoods, SOLICITORS J., May 11,
2001, at 424.
4. Abouzaidv. MothercareLtd.,No. B3/2000/2273, 2000 WL 1918530 (Eng. C.A.
Dec. 21, 2000) (alleging defective fleece-lined "Cosytoes" infant sleeping bags).
5. Worsley v. Tambrands Ltd., 2000 P.I.Q.R. P95 (Q.B. 1999) (Ebsworth, J.)
(alleging defective tampons).
6. Foster v. Biosil, 59 B.M.L.R. 178 (Q.B. 2000) (Cherie Booth, QC) (alleging
defective breast implants).

174. Those readily available in English or English translation.
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7. Richardson v. LRC Prods. Ltd., 2000 Lloyd's Rep.(Medical) 280 (Q.B.)
(Kennedy, J.) (alleging a defective condom).
8. Relph v. Yamaha Motor Co., (Q.B. 1996) (Brown, J.) (unreported decision)
(alleging defective all-terrain vehicle). See Simon Pearl, Note, 18 PROD. LIAB.
INT'L 121 (1996) (discussing Relph v. Yamaha Motor Co.).
9. A.B. v. S.W. Water Servs. Ltd., 1993 Q.B. 507 (Eng. C.A. 1992) (involving a
group claim arising from chemically contaminated drinking water).
NETHERLANDS
1. Schloten/The Foundation Sanquin of Blood Supply, Rb., Amsterdam, 3 februari
1999, NJ 621 (ann. DV) (concerning HIV infection from blood transfusions) (also
known as Hartman v. Stichting Sanquin Bloedvoorziening; A v. OLVG Hosp.
Amsterdam).
ITALY
1. Daniele Bonaca & Roberto Marengo, An Overview ofProductLiabilityLaw in
Italy, 5 EUROPEAN PROD. LIAB. REv., Dec. 2001, at5 (noting three decisions: Court
of Rome (Mar. 17, 1998); Supreme Court (Sept. 29, 1995); Court of Monza (July
20, 1993)).
AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, GREECE, PORTUGAL, & SPAIN
1. J. Peris, Liabilityfor Defective Productsin the European Union: Developments
Since 1995-The European Commission's GreenPaper,CONSUMER L.J., 1999, at
331 (describing a series of cases); Antonio J. Vela Sanchez, ProductsLiability in
Spain, 32 TEX. TECH. L.REV. 979 (2001) (focusing on Spain).
GERMANY
1. BGHZ 129, 353; VIZR 158/94, IN NJW 1995, 2162. See also Christopher
Hodges, The Case of the Exploding Bottle of Water, 18 PROD. LIAB. INT'L 73
(1996).
FRANCE
1. T.G.I. Provence, Oct. 2,2001, D. [2001], 1R.3092 (concerning a fireplace glass
window that exploded). See also C.Larroumet, The Exploding FireplaceCase,
EUROPEAN PROD. LIAB. REV., Dec. 2001, at 30.
2. CA Toulouse, Feb. 22, 2000, Gaz. Pal. [2001], 2, somm., 11 (concerning
contraction of trichnellosis from eating defective horsemeat).
See also
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C.Larroumet, Toulouse Court ofAppeal Rules on Suppliers'Liability,EUROPEAN
PROD. LIAB. REV., Mar. 2001, at 22.
AUSTRALIA
1. Cheong v. Wong & Ors (2001) N.S.W.S. Ct. R. 881 (alleging defective tire).
2. Carey-Hazell v. Getz Bros. & Co. Pty (2001) F.C.A. 703 (alleging defective
prosthetic heart valve).
3. Cookv. Pasminco Ltd (2000) 99 F.C.R. 548 (concerning environmental injury);
See also Cook v. Pasminco Ltd [No 2] (2000) 107 F.C.R. 44.
4. Ryan v. Great Lakes Council (1999) 78 F.C.R. 309, on appeal sub nom.,
Graham Barclay Oysters Pty v. Ryan (2000) 102 F.C.R. 307 (alleging defective
oysters).
5. Lopez v. Star World Enter. Pty (1999) F.C.A. 104, BC9900314 (alleging
defective food).
6. Australian Competition & Consumer Comm'n v. Glendale Chem. Prods. Pty
(1998) 40 I.P.R. 619, affidby, (1999) 90 F.C.R. 40 (concerning defective chemical
drain cleaner).
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